柏拉圖中期的相論-知識與相

3. Episteme and Doxa

a) Whatever knowable must be and whatever is must be knowable; knowledge refers to being. Whatever unknowable must not be and whatever is not must be unknowable; ignorance refers to non-being.
可知者必是，是者必可知。弗可知者必弗是，弗是者必弗可知。

(筆者註:可知的必[是]的,[是]的必可知的。換言之,[思]與[是]等同的。與巴曼尼德斯的原則一樣。)

b) Episteme and doxa are powers of soul. Each power of soul corresponds to its own referent. As knowledge and doxa are different, so are their referents. Doxa lies between episteme and ignorance. It is more opaque than knowledge but clearer than ignorance. It refers to that which lies between being and non-being, that is, appearance, or many.
知識與似見為心靈能力，似見介於知識與無知之間，指涉是者與弗是者之間，即現象或多。

(筆者註: Episteme and doxa都是心靈能力。Doxa介乎於[知識]與[無知]之間,所以涉及[是]與[非是]之間,因此為[多]
。)

c) Episteme is the power of soul which can see both one and many, and distinguishes between them. Doxa is the power of soul which can only see the many, but cannot see the one, and is not able to understand the one.
知識為Episteme，能見一與多，並區分兩者。似見為心靈能力，僅能見多，弗能見一，不能認知一。

(筆者註: Episteme作為心靈能力,能夠區別[一]與[多]。
Doxa則只能見[多],卻不能見/認知[一]。)

(待續)